POSSIBILITIES FOR LOWER AIRLINE COSTS
JOSEPH

L. Nicno.SON*

With the close of the war, interest is quickened in commercial air transportation.
The forecasting of passenger fares at rail rates has become widespread. Juan Trippe,
President of Pan American World Airways System, stated, sometime ago, that his
company could offer passenger fares to Latin America of 3 c a mile and cargo
rates as low as ioc a ton mile when improved planes are available.' Other airline
spokesmen have made similar statements.
However, improved planes, engines and fuels offer only a partial answer to the
question of lower fares and rates. Lying beyond the control of the designer, yet
important in the total cost of transporting passengers and cargo, are ground and
indirect expensesla In fact, if planes flew at no cost at all, the fares promised by these
optimistic prophets would fail in many instances to cover ground and indirect expenses. Even with the large volume of operation the average 1943 ground and
indirect cost for 15 domestic airlines was 27.7 cents per ton-mile, or 64.1% of total
operating costs. In the case of international "American Flag" lines, the ton-mile
cost was over $i.oo. Pan American Airways in November, 1945 proposed a fare of
$275 between New York and London based on permission to fly four trips instead
of two per week. This still would have left passenger fares about io cents a
passenger-mile.
During the past five years direct costs per ton-mile for domestic airlines have
been cut in half chiefly because of increased utilization, heavier loads per plane and
reductions in depreciation charges. The per ton-mile ground and indirect expenses
in the same period have only been reduced about ii%. From 1938 through 1943,
there was a 7.8% increase in ground and indirect expenses for every io% gain in
revenue ton-miles. Unless overhead shows a tendency to decrease more rapidly than
the increase in volume of business done, it is likely to wipe out all the economies of
the proposed new planes.
A formula for determining the operation cost of new types of aircraft was developed in 1938. At that time overhead was about 80% of direct flying cost. Some
aircraft manufacturing companies, in calculating the performance costs of their
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Operating expense categories as established by the Civil Aeronautics Board arc as follows:
Aircraft Operatng Expenses (direct)
Flying Operations
Flight Equipment Maintenance-direct
Depreciation-Flight Equipment
Ground and Indirect Expenses
Ground Operations
Passenger Service
Ground Equipment Maintenance--direct
Traffic and Sales
Equipment Maintenance--indirect
Advertising and Publicity
Depreciation-Ground Equipment
General and Administrative
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projected ships, have fallen into the error of still basing overhead at 8o of direct

operating cost. As a matter of fact, direct operating costs and overhead do not
maintain a fixed relationship as the following table shows:
1939-1943 CALENDAR YEAR TOTAL, GROUND AND INDIRECT COSTS2
Direct Flying
Ground and Indirect
Actual
Per Ton Mile
Actual
Per Ton Mile

z939 ............... $26,o2z,92i
1940................ 34,789,659
1941 ............... 43,931,956
1942 ................ 35,410,275
'943 ............... 33,324,946

32.9I
29.36

$24,513,239
34,712,139
44,193,940
46,943,996
59,5o7,624

28.07

20.26
15.51

31.OI
29.30

28.18
26.28
27.71

In most businesses fixed charges per unit of production go down as volume increases but the airlines have experienced a rise in ground and indirect expenses
almost as fast as tonnage volume.
INDEX OF TONNAGE VOLUME VS. GROUND AND INDIRECT COSTS

(1939

-- IO0)
Tonnage Volume

1939 .. .......................100.0
1940. ....................... 149.9
1941 ......................... 197.9
1942 ........................
221.
1943 ........................ 271.7

Ground and
Indirect Costs

100.0
141.6
179.9
191.5

242.8

Between 1939 and 1943, despite the i7el/, increase in ton-miles performed, total
ground and indirect expenses declined only 10o on a ton-mile basis. Such items
as passenger service and general and administrative expenses actually increased. In
contrast, direct operating expenses declined 53%.
ComPA
n

TvE AIRLINE OPERATING EXPENSES FOR CALENDAR YEARS 1939 AND

1943

(Showing per cent of increase or decrease in various categories of ground and indirect expense)
1939

1943

Cents
Per

Cents
Per

Ton-Mile

Aircraft Operating Expenses ................ 32.91

Ton-Mile

Per Cent

Decrease

15.51

53

9.13
-67
2.48
3.17
4.32
2.05

IxI

Ground and Indirect Expenses:
Ground Operations ...................
Ground Equipment Maintenance-Direct ..
Equipment Maintenance-Indirect ........

2.55

Passenger Service

2.32

........................

Traffic and Sales ........................
Advertising and Publicity .......

General and Administrative .............

.3o
.74

5.06
2.78
5.11

5.25

Depreciation--Ground Equipment ........ .115
Total Ground and Indirect Expenses .........
31.oi

.64
27.71

Total Operating Expenses ................

9
3
27"
14
26

3*
44
II

63.92
43.22
32
Increase.
2
All tables and quoted statistics, for this and subsequent data in these pages, unless otherwise noted,
are developed for the same 15 domestic airlines from C.A.B., ANNUAL AintuE STArissS, DoatEsc
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From 1939 to 1943 all business costs have risen, but in the case of airlines, indirect costs have actually increased
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per cent as against iio.6 per cent in rev-

enues. Such a jump in indirect costs would be understandable when high promotional and educational expenses are necessary to develop new business. Today, that
situation for the airlines does not exist. Passengers are being turned away. Because
overhead in this period of peak traffic has risen faster than revenues, its reduction
is uncertain after the war when airlines are again seeking business. Will a continuation of past air carrier policies work toward high costs?
A policy contributing to high costs has been the addition of unprofitable stops
and routes producing small revenue. It is natural for an airline to want to expand
and many new stops have been installed with the hope of building up traffic. Still
other stops or extensions have been inaugurated as defensive methods to prevent one
airline from invading another's territory. However, where traffic does not exist, the
initiation of new routes and stops has been costly.
The following table lists air mail routes showing continuous losses for the four
fiscal years 1938-1941, despite the large proportion of revenue derived in most instances from air-mail payments :3
Line
American ......
Braniff ........
Inland ........
Penn-Central ...
Penn-Central ...
Penn-Central ...
TWA .........
TWA ........

4-Year Total

Route

Revenues

A.M.2z ..... $1,567,488.87
A.M.5o .....
245,647.00
445,453.39
A.M. 3 5 .....
1,538,393.6o
A.M. 3 2 .....
A.M. 3 4 .....
273,551.00
Non-mail
routes ......
25,740.58
A.M. 3 6 .....
720,049.71
A.M. 3 7 .....
561,952.74

TWA ..........

Non-mail
routes ......

United ........

A.M.r7

352,759.94

United ........ .A.M. 5 7 .....

231,583.26

.....

Mail

41.20

27.34
79.35
34.71
. 48.77

22.92

43.09

2,373,576.19

.....

Western Air ... A.M.r9

Per Cent 4-Year Total

r,482,527.08

Total ...... $o,oo8,722.36

Losses

S

Points

221,934.o9
107,397.34
72,249.74
18i,015.79
212,805.70

Boston-Cleveland
San Antonio-Corpus Christi
Huron-Cheyenne
Detroit-Chicago-Milwaukee
Washington-Buffalo

323,793.93
351,262.15
684,277.56

Dayton-Chicago
Winslow-San Francisco

791,677.62
67.86

73.07

229,345.83

Cheyenne-Denver

239,163.26

Seattle-Vancouver
(no mail revenues)

172,559.93

Gt. Falls-Salt Lake City

$3,587,482.94

This four-year record indicates the difficulty of building up traffic between points
where its does not already exist.. Although these routes averaged a loss of about 21
cents per revenue-mile for the period and diverted earnings from surface carriers,
airline prestige and political pressure makes their continuance almost a necessity.
Despite their experience with unprofitable routes, practically every airline is seeking extensions to numerous small cities or in directions where traffic flow is small.
The applications before the C.A.B. for new route mileage on January 1, 1944, were
practically double the existing railroad trackage. The airline, in considering expan1938-1942 (1943).
The calendar year of 1943 developed from C.A.B.'s
monthly airline statistics. As a common denominator for volume all traffic has been converted to tonmiles. Each passenger and baggage equals 200 pounds.
'C.A.B., ANNUAL AIRLINE STA1-ISTICS, FISCAL YEARS 1936-x94I (942).
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sion, might benefit from the history of railroad expansion when efforts were made
to link every hamlet. The least profitable branch lines were the first to succumb to
the competition of the automobile, truck and bus, and the amount of trackage
abandoned is testimony to the danger of expanding to areas of low traffic density.
The economic sphere of air transportation is to provide rapid service between
large cities hundreds of miles apart. As a consequence, airline profits are determined by an inter-relationship of speed, distance and most important of all, size of
population served. In the scramble for new routes the airlines are forgetting that
they cannot get profitable traffic at the bottom of the population barrel. Eightyeight of the one hundred and ninety-two cities receiving passenger air service in
September, 194o, accounted for only 6 per cent of the total passenger traffic. About
15 cities with a population between io,ooo and 20,000 averaged 5 passengers or less
per day. Yet TWA, for example, has filed applications for new routes to serve 13
Ohio cities4 in addition to the four already served, and in Illinois, 13 stops in addition to its single stop-Chicago. A recent study made by United Air Lines reveals
that with 15-minute stops every 50 miles, feeder planes have an average speed little
better than that of a private car or train. If stops are reduced to 5 minutes, the
speed would average 6o m.p.h. or about 20 m.p.h. faster.5
In transportation economics local tariffs have always been much higher than
through rates because terminal costs, physical and clerical, are a large part of the
total cost for the short haul. If many of the routes proposed by the airlines go into
operation, a lowering of airline rates will be impossible. These attempt to cobweb
sparsely populated and closely located areas will encounter four major difficulties:
(i)new cost levels will be started as a result of additional investment in facilities;
(2) lower traffic density or the revenue ton-miles per route mile will be encountered; (3)numerous stops impair the benefit of speed; (4) frequent schedules of
surface transportation will offset the speed advantage of the airplane if flights are
infrequent.
In spite of the high cost of terminal charges, airline spokesmen have preached
against a co-ordinated transportation system. Dr. John H. Frederick has stated:
"Sales and advertising policy to sell cargo transportation services ... should be completely divorced from the railroads and rail express.:" This viewpoint overlooks the
higher costs involved when the airlines take on the functions of other existing agencies. Furthermore, flying air cargo differs from flying passengers or mail in that
two profits are required-one for the airline and one for the patron who pays the
charges. Likewise, this viewpoint overlooks the fact that approximately 30 per cent
of all air express is transported by rail in some part of the journey. The very fact
that airports are so far from central city points is basic for co-ordinated air-surface
transportation. For illustration, St. Louis airport is located 17 miles from the busiTRANSCONTINENTAL &
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(June 5, 1944) 1 AATIo-N NEws 37.
6
Dr. John H. Frederick, address before Air Cargo meeting of the Society of Automotive Engineers,
November 10, 1943, Chicago.
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ness district, Los Angeles is 15 miles distant, with the national average between 7
and 8.
Instead of opposing co-operation which offers possibilities of bettering the national
transportation system, airlines should recognize the value of it. In the final analysis, public convenience and necessity, not the airlines, should determine the type of
transportation of greatest benefit. To attain a greater volume of traffic, enabling
lower costs, some form of integration or co-ordination may be forced upon airlines
by competition, just as it was on the railroads in adopting bus lines and door-to-door
delivery of freight.
The high cost of airline operation has been abetted by governmental rate-making
theories. Because transportation has been treated as a monopoly by governmental
agencies, rates have been regulated by decree rather than by competition. Rates
charged by railroads in the early stages of their development could make or break
an industry or community because it was often wholly dependent upon railroad
services and so government regulation of rates came into being. Today, communities and industries are competitively served not only by railroads but by public
motor carriers, trucks and cars privately owned and, to a certain extent, the airplane
and water carrier. We have outgrown the necessity or regulating rates.
Rate setting, based on a fair return on invested capital, has encouraged the larger
fixed investments that are characteristic of publicly-regulated utilities and has resulted in a certain lack of cost-mindedness. This is evident in the government's
inclusion of Depreciation of Flying Equipment as a direct cost in the "278o" report
forms submitted by airlines to the C.A.B. If depreciation were properly classified
in airline accounting the 1943 ground and indirect costs per ton-mile would be over
2 cents higher. Furthermore, if total overhead expenses in 1943 had been properly
allocated to passenger-transportation, which gives rise to the greatest share of airline
overhead, a fare-rate of at least 4 cents per passenger-mile would have been needed
to meet this item of per passenger-mile expenses. This rate would have been necessary in spite of the highest volume of traffic ever carried and a load factor of 88
per cent. In 1940, with a load factor of 58 per cent, a fare of nearly 6 cents was
needed to cover overhead.
Today, with the many optional methods of transportation available, rates should
be regulated by competition, safeguarded by enforcement of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act. This is particularly true for air transportation where public regulation has
gone beyond its requirements. Transportation is no longer a monopoly. A comparatively small investment is required to launch an air service or to extend one
line into the territory served by another. Unlike the railroad, the airline maintains
no rights-of-way, terminals or grade' crossings. Yet the Civil Aeronautics Board is
regulating rates for this new competitor in the transportation field in terms of the
monopoly concept evolved many years ago by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
By adjustments in the mail pay, the C.A.B. regulates the return on invested capital
for airlines to approximately 8 per cent for domestic operations and io per cent for
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foreign carriers. When airlines have shown increased earnings through efficient
management, their mail rates have been cut. As a consequence, ground and indirect expenditures have risen with earnings.
In addition to the threat of governmental encroachment on the airlines in the
immediate post-war period, there is the more distant danger of competition from
the private airplane in both the passenger and cargo versions, whose effects on the
air transport industry may resemble those of the motor vehicle on the railroad. Already former air force pilots, with surplus equipment, have started in business as
taxi operators and contract carriers. Their lower direct and overhead costs give
them a distinct competitive advantage over the airlines. These threats, both immediate and remote, provide a further need to constantly strive for lower costs and
fares.
With the tapering off of the largest proportion of today's business, travel and
mail generated by the services, airline operations will become increasingly high-cost
as traffic approaches the saturation point for present fare and express rates. Studies
of potential air express business show relatively small expansion occurring until present rates are cut in half. According to a recent study7 prepared for the United
Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Association, air carriers must reduce their rates to below
io cents a ton-mile, which is about one-third the present overhead, if they are to
develop any appreciative market for air-borne fruit and vegetables. This is less than
one-sixth the basic rate for air express of 6 14 cents per ton-mile.
Economies are possible through the joint or co-operative operation of ground
facilities. The sale of tickets, the handling of traffic, dispensing of weather information and the dispatching of planes could be operated jointly by two or more airlines, instead of separately z4 hours a day. After the initial effects of the invasion
of one line into another's territory are over, consolidation of ground facilities might
succeed the joint operation. C. R. Smith, Chairman of American Airlines, has even
proposed 8 running planes like buses, say between New York and Chicago, within a
few minutes apart so that the overflow of passengers from one company's flight
would be cared for by the next flight of whatever it might be.
Luxury is the keynote of present air travel. Evidence of the importance some
airlines place on service is a statement of Jack Frye,9 President of Transcontinental
& Western Airlines: "I am convinced that we cannot now, if ever, lower our standards of service. Quality service built up our business and is necessary to maintain
customer loyalty." He went on to indicate that mass transportation by air was a
matter of fifteen or more years. With the necessity of maintaining their load factor,
especially as more and larger planes become available, the airlines will be forced to
decide whether they are to stress a super-personalized service, or to'attract the butcher,
the baker and their families. When the airlines go after this type of business, lower
'Ralph

F. Myers and Glenn F. Phillips, "Shipment of Perishables Made by Ralph E. Myers Co."

(945).

'C. R. Smith, What We Need Is a Good Three-Cent Airline (Oct. 20, 1945) SAT. EvE. PosT.
' Address before the National Aviation Clinic, Oklahoma City, Nov. 19, 1945.
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fares rather than chrome trimmings and the proposed cocktail bars will be the far
more powerful inducement to travel. A type of operation more closely resembling
the inter-city bus lines offers the possibility of lower fares through lower indirect
costs. A comparison of 1943 figures for Southeastern Greyhound with those of three
transcontinental airlines illustrates the bus line's operating economy:
DIECT AND INDIRECT EXPENSES1 0

(in cents per passenger-mile)
Direct

(a) Southeastern Greyhound" ...... 50
(b) 3 airlines-TWA, United
and American ........... i.5

Indirect

Total

.43

.93

2.64

4.15

The indirect costs of bus line operation were only one-sixth those of the airlines.
While it is not suggested that air and bus travel service are strictly comparable, the
bus carriers' costs provide a goal toward which airlines could conceivably strive.
Emphasis on price rather than on service has been the keynote of appeal to the
masses, not only of bus transportation, but also of self-service markets, variety stores,
cafeterias and tourist camps. Expansion in the commercial aviation field is a matter
of national concern, particularly to the more than 2 million men associated with the
operation of military aircraft and the 2 millions more engaged in manufacturing
planes and accessories. From such a large group trained in the industry there is
likely to arise political pressure to provide jobs through government subsidy or
operation. Expanding industries have generally been associated with progressively
lower costs. Adherence to this pattern will be necessary if air transportation is to
achieve its place among major United States industries.
" Derived by converting mail, express and excess baggage pound miles flown into ton-miles and
reconverting this total into passenger miles on the basis of 200 pounds per passenger and baggage.
'I.C.C. Docket 32783 (943), Report to Interstate Commerce Commission.

